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I.  INTRODUCTION 
¶1         The freedom of speech is so engrained in American society that “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”1 Yet, Congress 
frequently conditions federal funding allocations on requirements that recipients refrain 
from or engage in certain speech.2 A recent Supreme Court decision articulated a new 
standard to determine when a funding condition that implicates speech is a proper 
exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause and when the condition 
unconstitutionally burdens recipients’ First Amendment rights.3 In Agency for 
International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (AOSI), the 
Court enjoined enforcement of a provision of the Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (Leadership Act), finding that the requirement that 
organizations implementing the Act adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution4 was 
an unconstitutional restriction of their right to free speech.5 
¶2         Enacted in 2003, the Leadership Act appropriated $48 billion to improve research, 
treatment, and prevention programs to combat the international spread of HIV/AIDS.6 In 
response to findings that “the sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such 
industry, and sexual violence are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic,” Congress placed two conditions on the receipt of Leadership Act 
funding.7 First, the Act stipulates that funding may not be used to “promote or advocate 
the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.”8 Second, under what is 
known as the Policy Requirement, no organization that lacks a “policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking” may receive funding under the Act, except for 
                                                        
* Candidate for J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2015. The author would like to thank 
Professor Erin F. Delaney and Professor Jason C. DeSanto for their guidance in support of this article. 
1
 USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
2
 See infra text accompanying notes 57–85. 
3
 See AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2327–28, 2332.   
4
 U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2008). 
5
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2332. 
6
 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–82 (2008). 
7
 Id. §§ 7601–23. 
8
 Id. § 7631(e). 
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the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health 
Organization, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and any United Nations agency.9 
¶3         This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in AOSI to strike down the 
Policy Requirement and argues that the Court articulated a new speech-conditioned 
funding standard, distinguishing between conditions that “define the limits of the 
government spending program” and those that “seek to leverage funding to regulate 
speech outside the contours of the program itself.”10 This “limits–leverage” standard 
consolidated existing speech-conditioned funding doctrines, combining their application 
to funding conditions that implicate speech. The standard protects the primary 
justification for protecting recipients’ freedom of speech in conditional funding cases—
the development of knowledge—by preserving their ideas and opinions on matters of 
public debate. In practice, however, the standard will not protect the speech of most 
recipients of speech-conditioned foreign aid. Since the 1980s, Congress has relied 
increasingly on foreign organizations to deliver developmental and humanitarian aid, as 
they generally have greater access to areas and people in need of foreign aid than their 
American counterparts.11 Because Congress can allocate foreign aid funds to foreign 
recipients, who are not entitled to First Amendment protection,12 instead of to U.S. 
recipients, it can bypass the constitutional limits on speech-conditioned foreign aid 
funding. Thus, although conditions that “leverage funding to regulate speech outside the 
contours of the program”13 exceed Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, they 
will nonetheless prevail with respect to foreign organizations who implement U.S. 
foreign aid programs. 
¶4         Part II of this article reviews the system of U.S. foreign aid funding and the history 
of the Leadership Act, the Act challenged in AOSI. Part III discusses the congressional 
spending power and the limits imposed on it by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
Part IV details the state of First Amendment doctrine with respect to funding conditions 
prior to AOSI. Part V describes the litigation leading up to AOSI. Part VI asserts that the 
Supreme Court in AOSI articulated a new standard to determine when a funding 
condition that implicates free speech is an unconstitutional burden on recipients’ free 
speech: whether the condition leverages the congressional spending power to control 
speech beyond the federal funding program. Part VII contends that this standard advances 
the primary justification behind protecting funding recipients from conditions that restrict 
their free speech—the development of knowledge and truth—by preserving a variety of 
opinions in the “marketplace of ideas.” Finally, Part VIII argues that in practice, the 
AOSI standard will not protect free speech in foreign aid funding programs because 
                                                        
9
 Id. § 7631(f). Initially, the Policy Requirement was not enforced against U.S. NGOs. Declaration of Paul 
P. Colborn at 13, Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-CV-8756(VM), 2011 WL 
4001146 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). The Department of Justice warned that the restriction “would prevent 
or require certain advocacy or positions in activities completely separate from the federally funded 
programs . . . [and] cannot be constitutionally applied to U.S. organizations.” Id. However, in 2005, the 
Bush administration began enforcing the requirement against U.S. NGOs. Id. 
10
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. 
11
 See USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND 
OPPORTUNITY 117 (2002). 
12
 DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. USAID, 887 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
never limited its absolute wording of the principle that nonresident aliens are without First Amendment 
rights.”). 
13
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. 
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Congress will eschew its restrictions by confining fund allocation to foreign recipients, 
who are not protected by the First Amendment. Part IX concludes. 
 
II.  FEDERAL FUNDING FOR FOREIGN AID 
A.  Foreign Aid 
¶5         Foreign aid has long been an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.14 While the 
President has primary responsibility and power to set U.S. foreign policy objectives, 
Congress allocates funds to agencies to implement those policies.15 The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) is the primary agency through which Congress 
distributes foreign aid, established to promote democracy internationally and to provide 
aid to developing foreign states.16 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) also distribute foreign aid funds.17 Foreign 
policy, the allocation of foreign aid, and the imposition of conditions on foreign aid funds 
all work together to contribute to national interests achieved internationally.18  
¶6         Throughout American history, and especially today, civil society and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have shared an intimate relationship. 
Specifically, nonprofit organizations enjoy a significant role in the social and political 
landscape of the country act as laboratories for social change and strategies not feasible 
by the U.S. government;19 the U.S. nonprofit sector consists of an estimated 1.58 million 
                                                        
14
 Alexander L. George & Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of National Interests: Uses and Limitations, in 
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE 
217, 218 (Alexander L. George ed., 1980) (“The concept of national interest continues to be important to 
foreign-policymakers . . . . They have used the concept in two different ways: first, as a criterion to assess 
what is at stake in any given situation and to evaluate what course of action is ‘best’; second, as a 
justification for decisions taken.”).  
15
 Richard F. Grimmett, U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress (June 1, 
1999), available at http://fpc.state.gov/6172.htm. 
16
 Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2014) (“USAID is the lead 
U.S. government agency that works to end extreme global poverty and enable resilient, democratic 
societies to realize their potential . . . . U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of 
furthering America’s [foreign policy] interests while improving lives in the developing world . . . . 
Spending less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID works in over 100 countries” to 
accomplish its goals of “protect[ing] human rights” and “improv[ing] global health.”).  
17
 See CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23 (2011). International developmental aid is also 
promulgated by the U.S. State Department. Id. 
18
 See Felix E. Oppenheim, National Interest, Rationality, and Morality, 15 POL. THEORY 
369, 369–70 (1987). The granting of foreign aid to another nation can directly and indirectly serve U.S. 
national interests. See Alexander L. George & Robert O. Keohane, The Concept of National Interests: Uses 
and Limitations, in PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECTIVE USE OF 
INFORMATION AND ADVICE 217 (Alexander L. George ed., 1980) (“Foreign-policy problems . . . typically 
engage a multiplicity of competing values and interests . . . . In principle, the criterion of national interest, 
which occupies so central a place in discussions of foreign policy, should assist decision-makers to cut 
through much of this value complexity . . . .”). 
19
 See LESTER M. SALAMON & S. WOJCHIECH SOKOLOWSKI, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 23 (2004) (“By establishing connections among individuals, involvement in 
associations teaches norms of cooperation that carry over into political and economic life.”); see also 
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organizations that contributed $836.9 billion to the U.S. economy in 2011, making up 5.6 
percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).20 NGOs also contribute 
significantly to American society and identity through public charity.21 Finally, the 
diverse range of viewpoints among NGOs allows for competition among relevant 
interests and thus enhances civic engagement and democracy.22 The nonprofit sector 
serves an indispensable role in the fair functioning of the country and in promoting the 
interests and welfare of its people.23  
¶7         Foreign aid funds conditioned on certain requirements of recipient NGOs help 
Congress to further its international policy goals. As the primary agency distributing U.S. 
foreign aid, USAID frequently collaborates with foreign NGOs to implement U.S. 
foreign policy goals within targeted countries.24 While distributing funds that Congress 
appropriates for governmental initiatives, USAID “has always had the twofold purpose of 
furthering America’s interests while improving lives in the developing world.”25 Given 
the efficiency of enlisting an organization with expertise in any given area, the 
government has increasingly enlisted NGOs to deliver publicly financed services, and 
thus government funding has become the most important source of income for most 
charitable nonprofit organizations;26 government funds supply almost a third of nonprofit 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 133 (1898) (arguing that American democracy relies 
on the strength and influence of non-governmental associations). “As soon as several of the inhabitants of 
the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they look 
out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found each other out, they combine.” Id. 
20
 SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND 
VOLUNTEERING 1 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412923-The-
Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf. 
21
 See id. (“Of the nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS, 501(c)(3) public charities accounted for 
more than three-quarters of the nonprofit sector’s revenue and expenses . . . . In 2012, total private giving 
from individuals, foundations, and businesses exceeded $300 billion . . . for the first time since the 
recession started . . . .”).   
22
 See J. Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizations and Political Advocacy, in NONPROFIT SECTOR: A 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 307, 308 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“Interests are 
diverse and inherently subjective. One person’s ‘public good’ may be another’s ‘public bad.’ Those who 
claim to speak in the name of the general public can claim no privileged insight.”). 
23
 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 122 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 
1991) (1859) (“Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary 
associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience.”). 
24
 CURT TARNOFF & MARIAN LEONARDO LAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40213, FOREIGN AID: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 21–23 (2011); see USAID, FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND OPPORTUNITY 117 (2002), available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usaid/foreign_aid_in_the_national_interest-full.pdf.  
25
 Who We Are, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are (last updated Jan. 29, 2014). 
26
 See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE 
AGE OF CONTRACTING 4 (1993) (“Rather than relying mostly on private charity and volunteers, most 
nonprofit service organizations depend on governmental support for over half of their revenues: for many, 
government support comprises their entire budget. In contrast to the traditional image of government and 
nonprofits as two independent sectors, the new relationship amounts to one of mutual dependence.”); see 
also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 13 (2d ed. 1999) (“[There is] often a 
preference for some nongovernmental mechanism to deliver services and respond to public needs because 
of the cumbersomeness, unresponsiveness, and bureaucratization that often accompanies governmental 
action . . . . Even when government financing is viewed as essential . . . it is often the case that private, 
nonprofit organizations are utilized to deliver the services that government finances.”). 
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revenues, more than twice as much as private charitable giving.27 The government and 
the nonprofit sector are mutually dependent on each other to make public service works 
possible.28  
B.  The Leadership Act 
¶8         Although the U.S. government has been combatting the spread of HIV/AIDS since 
1986,29 2001 brought the epidemic into the international spotlight, when the United 
Nations adopted the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, urging members to 
establish policies and dedicate aid towards the prevention, treatment, and collaboration 
needed to stop and reverse the HIV/AIDS pandemic.30 UNAIDS estimated 35.3 million 
people were living with HIV in 2012, with 2.3 million new HIV infections globally.31 In 
response to urging from President George W. Bush, Congress enacted the Leadership Act 
in 2003 to combat the global spread of the diseases.32 Congress’s stated purpose of the 
Act is “to strengthen and enhance United States leadership and the effectiveness of the 
United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics and other 
related and preventable infectious diseases as part of the overall United States health and 
development agenda.”33 The Leadership Act prescribes, inter alia, a comprehensive 
strategy to fight the international spread of HIV/AIDS.34 Pursuant to that plan, Congress 
appropriated $48 billion to the Executive Branch to allocate to NGOs and foreign 
governments35 to improve treatment and prevention programs, especially for those at high 
risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, and to improve technical assistance, training and 
research.36  
¶9         In response to findings that “the sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such 
industry, and sexual violence are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic,”37 Congress placed two conditions on the receipt of funding. First, 
funding may not be used to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of 
prostitution or sex trafficking.”38 Second, under what is known as the Policy 
Requirement, no organization that lacks a “policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
                                                        
27
 SARAH L. PETTIJOHN, URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES, GIVING, AND 
VOLUNTEERING 3 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412923-The-
Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf. 
28
 For how insufficient government funding has an injurious effect on both nonprofit organizations and the 
general public, see NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, COSTS, COMPLEXIFICATION, AND CRISIS: 
GOVERNMENT’S HUMAN SERVICES CONTRACTING “SYSTEM” HURTS EVERYONE (Oct. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.govtcontracting.org/sites/default/files/Costs%20Complexification%20and%20Crisis.pdf. 
29
 HIV and AIDS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/hiv-and-
aids (last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
30
 G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (June 27, 2001). 
31




 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7601–25, 30 (2006). 
33
 Id. § 7603. 
34
 Id. § 7603. 
35
 Id. §§ 7671(a), 7631.  
36
 Id. § 7611(a). 
37
 Id. §§ 7601–23. 
38
 Id. § 7631(e). 
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trafficking” may receive funding under the Act, except for the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative, and any United Nations agency.39 The Policy Requirement prohibits 
non-exempted recipients from “engag[ing] in activities that are inconsistent with their 
opposition to prostitution and sex trafficking.”
40
 Further, affected recipients must state in 
their funding documents that they are “opposed to the practices of prostitution and sex 





III.  CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING AND ITS LIMITS 
A.  Congressional Spending Power 
¶10        Congress enjoys expansive powers to authorize funding to advance its policy goals.42 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to lay and collect taxes “to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”43 Under the 
Spending Clause, Congress has broad discretion to spend for the general welfare, which 
includes the power to fund particular governmental or private programs or activities.44 
Incident to this power, Congress may impose limits on the use of federal funds to ensure 
that recipients spend them according to congressional intent.45 Thus, Congress may use 
conditional funding to induce behavior that it could not regulate directly.46 
                                                        
39
 Id. § 7631(f). Initially, the Policy Requirement was not enforced against U.S. NGOs. Declaration of Paul 
P. Colborn at 13, Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09-CV-8756(VM), 2011 WL 
4001146 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). The Department of Justice warned that the restriction “would prevent 
or require certain advocacy or positions in activities completely separate from the federally funded 
programs . . . [and] cannot be constitutionally applied to U.S. organizations.” Id. However, in 2005, the 
Bush administration began enforcing the requirement against U.S. NGOs. Id. 
40
 HHS Organization Integrity of Entities That Are Implementing Programs and Activities Under the 
Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760, 18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014)); 
see also USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 05-04 amend. 3, Implementation of the United 
States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, as amended – Eligibility 
Limitation on the Use of Funds and Opposition to Prostitution and Sex Trafficking (2010). 
41
 45 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2014) (emphasis added). 
42
 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936) (“Congress . . . has a substantive power to tax and to 
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of 
the United States.”). 
43
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
44
 USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2013). 
45
 E.g., S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress may condition federal highway 
funds on a requirement that states prohibit the purchase and possession of alcohol by a person who is less 
than twenty-one years of age under the spending power). 
46
 Id. at 206–07 (“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly 
employed the power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Butler, 297 U.S. at 66 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public 
moneys for public purposes is not limited by direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”). 
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B.  Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
¶11         While the Spending Clause accords Congress extensive power to administer and 
condition funds, such conditions must not be unconstitutional.47 Generally, when “a party 
objects to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the 
funds.”48
 
However, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the 
“government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a 
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”49 Thus, 
a condition that coerces recipients into relinquishing their constitutional rights, for 
example, by leaving recipients no practical choice but to accept the funds, is an 
unconstitutional condition.50 In a seminal unconstitutional conditions case, Speiser v. 
Randall, the Supreme Court held that a state law that conditioned veterans’ receipt of a 
property tax exemption (reasoned to be equivalent to a cash grant) on a declaration that 
they would not advocate the overthrow of the government impermissibly coerced the 
individuals to refrain from constitutionally protected speech.51 
¶12         Although a condition that infringes on a recipient’s constitutionally protected rights 
is unlawful “even if he has no entitlement to that benefit,”52 the Court has upheld 
conditions that are merely decisions by Congress not to subsidize a particular message or 
activity.53 The Court has rejected the “notion that First Amendment rights are somehow 
not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State.”54 A series of doctrines has 
developed to determine whether federal funds conditioned on infringements of free 
speech are permissible exercises of the congressional spending power or whether they 
unconstitutionally encroach on recipients’ First Amendment rights. 
 
                                                        
47
 Dole, 483 at 208–09 (establishing the general standard of review for congressional conditional spending: 
(1) spending must be in pursuit of the “general welfare”; (2) Congress must unambiguously declare the 
condition such that the recipient can make an informed decision as to whether to accept the funds; (3) the 
condition must be rationally related to the government’s interest in the funding; and (4) the condition may 
not be otherwise unconstitutional).  
48
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. 
49
 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989). 
50
 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
51
 Id. at 518 (“To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to 
penalize them for such speech.”). 
52
 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (“Under this doctrine, the 
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . 
freedom of speech even if he has not entitlement to that benefit.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
53
 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding a condition on family planning funds 
that prevented recipients from using the funds in programs where abortion was a method of family 
planning, finding that Congress could “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes 
to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal 
with the problem in another way.”); see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 
540, 546 (1983) (upholding a restriction on tax-exempt organizations that prohibited them from lobbying 
because “Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”). 
54
 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Regan, 461 
U.S. at 549 (“[A] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right.”). 
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IV.  SPEECH-CONDITIONED FUNDING DOCTRINE 
¶13         Congress frequently offers funds to organizations on a condition that they refrain 
from or engage in certain speech.55 Such conditional funding requires courts to balance 
Congress’s broad spending power with the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by 
making value decisions as to “what speech is protected, under what circumstances, and 
when and how the government may regulate” to ensure funds are used appropriately.56 
The Supreme Court has developed a complex set of doctrines to conduct this balancing, 
applying different tests in particular contexts. These doctrines determine when speech-
related conditions unconstitutionally burden recipients’ First Amendment rights.  
A.  The Alternative Channels Test 
¶14         To determine whether a funding condition that implicates free speech is 
unconstitutional, the Court has assessed whether the restriction precludes alternative 
channels for expression. If the recipient does not have an adequate venue through which 
to express the restricted speech, the restriction is unconstitutional.
57
 In Federal 
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California, a condition that 
prohibited television station recipients of federal funds for public broadcasting from 
engaging in any editorializing left recipients without an alternative venue of expression 
because it prevented their “speech” (editorializing) regardless of whether it was publicly 
or privately funded.58 Thus, the condition was unconstitutional because it did not allow 
for adequate alternative channels of expression.59  
¶15         By contrast, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the Court 
upheld a requirement that nonprofit organizations seeking tax exemption status (reasoned 
to be equivalent to a cash grant) refrain from lobbying.60 In his concurrence, Justice 
Blackmun found that recipients’ ability to lobby by creating an affiliate, tax-paying 
organization saved what would otherwise have been an unconstitutional restriction on 
speech.61 He was satisfied that the creation of an affiliate was an adequate alternative 
means by which to engage in protected speech.62  
                                                        
55
 See infra text accompanying notes 57–85. 
56
 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1426 (1989); see also 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 570, 950–51 (4th ed. 2011). 
57
 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
58
 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400. 
59
 See id. at 395. The Court was especially suspicious of the prohibition against editorializing because it 
prohibited expression of the station’s viewpoints. See infra text accompanying notes 65–72. Because 
“expression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment 
values,” the condition was subject to heightened scrutiny. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 384 
(“Since . . . [t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on 
particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic, we must be particularly 
wary in assessing [the condition] to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt to allow a 
government to control the search for political truth.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
60
 Regan, 461 U.S. at 554. 
61
 Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
62
 Id.  
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¶16         Similarly, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a restriction on “Title X” family 
planning funds that prohibited recipients from using the funds in programs where 
abortion was a method of family planning.63 The Court held that recipients had adequate 
alternative channels to express their views on abortion, since the restriction acted only on 
Title X programs and did not forbid recipients from engaging in abortion-related 
activities using other funds.64  
B.  Viewpoint-Based Discrimination 
¶17         Restrictions on viewpoint-based speech may also be unconstitutional. Conditions 
that regulate the content of speech are suspect,
 
as such restrictions “raise . . . the specter 
that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
marketplace,”
65
 especially where those topics are matters of public importance.
66
 In  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court held that a 
public university magazine’s funding policy that refused funding to a Christian-based 
publication impermissibly impacted viewpoint-based speech.
67
 Because the policy 
discriminated against a journal with a particular viewpoint, it was an unconstitutional 
restriction on its freedom of speech.
68
  
¶18         The Court also invalidated a viewpoint-based restriction in Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez.69 There, the Legal Services Corporation Act, designed to support legal 
services for indigent clients, prohibited recipients from representing clients who wished 
to challenge existing welfare law.70 By defining the scope of the legal representation it 
funded to exclude certain ideas, Congress imposed a viewpoint-based condition.71 The 
Court held that the restriction impermissibly violated recipients’ First Amendment rights 
because it confined their ideas about their own government.72 
C.  Compelled Speech Versus Compelled Silence 
¶19         A condition that requires recipients to affirmatively espouse Congress’s viewpoint is 
more suspect than a condition that compel silence.73 In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, the Court found that a requirement that students salute the flag in 
school impermissibly compelled speech, and that “involuntary affirmation could be 
commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”74 Similarly, 
                                                        
63
 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
64
 Id. at 198. 
65
 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) 
(invalidating a state law requiring an ex-convict to remit profits earned from publishing a book describing 
his crimes to the state on the grounds that the restriction impermissibly imposed content-based financial 
disincentives on speech). 
66
 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984). 
67
 515 U.S. 819, 836–37 (1995). 
68
 Id. at 830–31. 
69
 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
70
 Id. at 549. 
71
 Id. at 542. 
72
 Id. at 548. 
73
 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943). 
74
 Id. 
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Wooley v. Maynard addressed a requirement that drivers display the state motto on their 
license plates.75 The Court held that the requirement was an unconstitutional invasion into 
freedom of speech by forcing the individual to portray the state’s message.76 These cases 
suggest that Congress must present stronger interests to compel speech than to require 
silence.77 
D.  Government Speech 
¶20         Under the government speech doctrine, Congress can condition funds that either 
create programs in which the government itself is the speaker or enlist private speakers to 
communicate its message.78 Indeed, the government must be able to express itself in 
order to properly function and to add its viewpoints for richer public debates.79 When 
Congress funds a program to convey a government message, it may impose speech 
restrictions to ensure its message is neither “garbled nor distorted” by the recipient.80 
¶21         Whether speech-conditioned funds fall within the ambit of government speech turns 
on whether the funds act on the program or the recipient.81 In Velazquez, for example, the 
Court found that Congress designed the legal clinic subsidies to regulate the private 
speech of the lawyers rather than to communicate government speech because the 
prohibition on challenges to the welfare law acted on the recipients, the lawyers, rather 
than on the program.82 In Rust, on the other hand, the Title X programs were venues of 
government speech, transmitted by private doctors,83 because the condition prohibiting 
abortion-related activities in the program worked on the program itself rather than on the 
                                                        
75
 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
76
 Id. at 715. 
77
 See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218, 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J., 
dissenting) (“The Supreme Court has suggested, without holding, that the government may be required to 
assert an even more compelling interest when it infringes the right to refrain from speaking than is required 
when it infringes the right to speak.”); cf. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (“The right to speak and the right to 
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of 
mind.’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)). 
78
 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“We have said that viewpoint-based funding 
decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust, 
in which the government used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
79
 David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded 
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 702 (1992). 
80
 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (characterizing the 
Court’s decision in Rust as recognizing “that [w]hen the government disburses public funds to private 
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its 
message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”). 
81
 Francis R. Hill, Speaking Truth to the Power the Funds Them: A Jurisprudence of Association for 
Advocacy Organizations Financially Dependent on Government Grants and Contracts, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 363, 398 (2012).  
82
 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547. 
83
 Id. at 541 (construing the condition in Rust as a way for Congress to “use[] private speakers to transmit 
information pertaining to its own program.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The Court in Rust did not 
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted 
to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on 
this understanding.” Id.  
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recipients.84 Although Congress made a policy choice in Rust that discriminated by 
viewpoint, that choice was permissible because its purpose was not to suppress an 
unpopular idea but to choose the message of the government, the limits of which 
Congress was free to define.85  
E.  The Interplay of the Speech-Conditioned Funding Doctrines: Inconsistent Application 
¶22         The Supreme Court has applied each of these First Amendment funding doctrines in 
different combinations and in different contexts. In League of Women Voters, the Court 
reviewed both whether the television station recipients had alternative channels of 
communicating editorialized content and the viewpoint-based nature of the restriction 
against editorializing.86 Combining these doctrines, the Court stated in dicta that if the 
stations had a privately-funded alternative, such a venue for editorialized broadcasts 
would have saved the constitutionality of the viewpoint-based nature of the restriction.87 
Similarly, in Velazquez, the Court rejected the government’s argument that restricting 
litigators from challenging the welfare law was a means to government speech on the 
matter, and instead found that the condition was an impermissible viewpoint-based 
restriction against challenges to the welfare law.88 In Rust, the nature of the Title X 
programs as government speech and the recipients’ alternative channels to engage in 
abortion-related activity overrode the viewpoint-based nature of prohibiting speech on 
abortion.89  
¶23         Although the Court has often drawn on more than one of the speech-conditioned 
funding doctrines to determine whether a funding condition violated free speech, it has 
not clarified whether or how these doctrines systematically interact with one another. 
Their application has been ad hoc, as the Court has considered some and not others in 
various cases, leaving little direction to future litigators. Further, the Court often has 
declined to articulate the controlling doctrine of each holding. The Court in AOSI applied 
the speech-conditioned funding doctrines more systematically than it has in the past by 
articulating a new standard for determining the constitutionality of a funding condition 
that implicated free speech. The following section describes the road to that decision. 
 
V.  LEADERSHIP ACT LITIGATION 
A.  AOSI District Court 
¶24         In 2005, a group of NGOs implementing the Leadership Act challenged the Policy 
Requirement, which conditioned Leadership Act funds on a statement that the recipient 
rejects the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking, claiming that it violated their First 
                                                        
84
 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 196 (1991) (“Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X 
grantee and a Title X project . . . . The regulations govern the scope of the Title X funds project’s 
activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities.”). 
85
 Id. at 194. 
86
 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
87
 Id. at 400–01. 
88
 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001). 
89
 Rust, 500 U.S. at 198. 
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Amendment rights to free speech.90 The plaintiff organizations operated international 
programs to fight HIV/AIDS through family planning services, sexual health counseling, 
and intravenous drug use education.91 They sued the federal agencies primarily 
responsible for overseeing implementation of the Act—USAID, HHS, and CDC—
seeking an injunction and a declaratory judgment that the Policy Requirement violated 
their First Amendment right to free speech.92 They further contended that the Requirement 
contradicted the purpose of the Act by hindering their ability to work with sex workers to 
reduce their risk of contracting HIV/AIDS.93  
¶25         The agencies countered that the Policy Requirement was a proper condition of 
federal funding within Congress’s spending power.94 They further argued that one of the 
purposes of the Leadership Act was to eradicate prostitution and sex trafficking and that 
the government was not obligated to subsidize activities contrary to that goal.95 Finally, 
the agencies asserted that the Leadership Act funds promulgated a government message 
that the United States denounces the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking and that 
the Policy Requirement was a proper means to protect that message from being garbled 
by recipients who would use private funds to “[endorse], either implicitly or explicitly, 
the very practices that the program aims to eliminate.”96 
¶26         The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the agencies from 
enforcing the Policy Requirement.97 It found that the Policy Requirement’s suppression 
of “eminently debatable questions such as what may be the most appropriate or effective 
policy to engage high-risk groups” in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS imposed an 
impermissible viewpoint-based condition.98 Additionally, the Policy Requirement 
compelled speech by forcing recipients to affirmatively denounce the practice of 
prostitution, making the viewpoint-based discrimination “even more offensive to the First 
Amendment.”99 Finally, the court rejected the agencies’ assertion that the Act created a 
                                                        
90
 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 430 F. Supp. 2d 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
91
 Id. at 230. 
92
 Id. at 238. In 2005, DKT International, one of the largest private providers of family planning services, 
also challenged the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement. DKT Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 435 F. Supp. 2d 
5 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also About DKT, DKT INT’L, 
http:www.dktinternational.org/about-dkt (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). The court struck down the Policy 
Requirement because it was a viewpoint-based condition that was insufficiently tailored to advance the 
government interest in maintaining integrity of its program. DKT Int’l, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 5, 13–14. On 
appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that the Policy Requirement was a permissible condition on a 
government-speech program. DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 761. The court reasoned that Congress can 
communicate a particular viewpoint through private speakers and may constitutionally require that those 
speakers do not convey contrary messages. Id. (“When it communicates its message, either through public 
officials or private entities, the government can—and often must—discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint.”). The court also found that the Policy Requirement did not prevent alternative means by which 
DKT could engage in its speech. Id. at 763 (“Nothing prevents DKT from itself remaining neutral and 
setting up a subsidiary organization that certifies it has a policy opposing prostitution.”). 
93
 AOSI, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 276. 
94






 Id. at 278. 
98
 Id. at 263. 
99
 Id. at 274. It is unclear from the text whether the compulsive nature of the Policy Requirement elevated 
the need for heightened scrutiny. See id. 
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government speech program because the exemption of certain organizations from the 
condition enabled the those recipients to make endorsements contrary to the message the 
government claimed to protect.100 
B.  AOSI Circuit Court 
¶27         The agencies appealed the district court decision.101 While the appeal was pending, 
HHS and USAID issued “organizational integrity” guidance (collectively, the 
“Guidelines”) designed to ameliorate the Policy Requirement’s constitutional 
decencies.102 The Guidelines allowed recipients to establish affiliated organizations not 
bound by the Policy Requirement, provided the recipients retained “objective integrity 
and independence.”103 A number of factors determined whether sufficient separation 
existed between a recipient and its affiliate, including: (1) whether the organizations were 
legally separate; (2) whether the organizations employed separate personnel; (3) the 
existence of separate accounting records; (4) whether the organizations used separate 
facilities; and (5) the existence of signs distinguishing between the organizations.104 In 
light of the new Guidelines, the circuit court remanded the case.105 The district court then 
issued another preliminary injunction,106 finding that the Guidelines cured neither the 
Policy Requirement’s discrimination against viewpoint-based speech nor its obligation to 
affirmatively adopt certain speech because the Guidelines required such a stark degree of 
separation between the recipients and the affiliates that they were ineffectual in 
remedying the burden on recipients’ First Amendment rights.107  
¶28         The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction.108 The court rejected the agencies’ 
argument that the Policy Requirement protected government speech, noting that the 
stated purpose of the Leadership Act was to combat HIV/AIDS rather than to eradicate 
prostitution.109 The exemption for certain organizations further supported the finding that 
opposing prostitution could not have been a central goal of the Act.110 Further, the 
Guidelines did not provide adequate alternative channels for speech because an affiliate’s 
                                                        
100
 Id. at 269. 
101
 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 254 F.App’x 843 (2d Cir. 2007). 
102
 See 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014). 
103
 Id. § 89.3. 
104
 Id.  
105
 AOSI, 254 F.App’x 843. 
106
 The court also extended the preliminary injunction to the U.S.-based members of co-plaintiffs Global 
Health Council and InterAction, which include nearly all of the U.S. NGOs implementing the Act. Alliance 
for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 570 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
107
 See id. at 545–49 (“While the Guidelines may or may not provide an adequate alternative channel for 
Plaintiffs to express their views regarding prostitution, the clause requiring Plaintiffs to adopt the 
Government’s view regarding the legalization of prostitution remains in tact. Plaintiffs are still not 
permitted to abstain from taking a view with regard to prostitution, but rather, are required to espouse the 
Government’s position.”). 
108
 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011). 
109
 Id. at 238. 
110
 Id. (The government “cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention program as 
an anti-prostitution messaging campaign,” lest the First Amendment be reduced to a “simple semantic 
exercise.”). 
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ability to engage in privately-funded silence did not cure recipients of the affirmative 
speech requirement of the Act.111   
 
VI.  SUPREME COURT DECISION 
¶29         The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding that the Policy 
Requirement violated the recipients’ First Amendment rights to free speech.112 To 
determine whether the Requirement unconstitutionally infringed upon recipients’ free 
speech, the Court articulated a new standard that distinguished between conditions that 
“define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify the activities 
Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate 
speech outside the contours of the program itself.”113 Under this standard, the relevant 
distinction is between conditions that Congress may properly impose to limit the use of 
federal funds and conditions that impermissibly leverage the spending power to control 
speech beyond the intent of the statute appropriating the funds.  
¶30         While it is well-established that Congress may limit funding to the programs it 
wants to subsidize,114 the limits–leverage standard contrasts that power to the leveraging 
of funds to regulate speech. As described above, the Court has consistently held that 
Congress may condition funds on behavior that it could not directly legislate as long as 
the condition does not violate recipients’ constitutional rights.115 To determine whether a 
funding condition that implicates free speech is unconstitutional, the limits–leverage 
standard asks whether the condition manipulates recipients beyond that which is 
necessary to protect the purpose of the federal funding program.116  
¶31         Although this bilateral distinction is new, what it relies on is old. The AOSI Court 
employed the reasoning of the four traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines to 
ascertain whether the Policy Requirement was a proper limit or unacceptable leverage, 
but applied them in a new way.117 While the protection of government speech allows 
Congress to limit the use of federal funds, inadequate alternative channels, viewpoint-
based discrimination, and compelled speech reveal conditions that unconstitutionally 
leverage funds. Applying the limits–leverage standard to the Policy Requirement of the 
Leadership Act, the Court found that the Requirement’s lack of alternative channels, its 
                                                        
111
 Id. at 239 (“It simply does not make sense to conceive of the Guidelines here as somehow addressing the 
Policy Requirement's affirmative speech requirement by affording an outlet to engage in privately funded 
silence; in other words, by providing an outlet to do nothing at all. It may very well be that the Guidelines 
afford Plaintiffs an adequate outlet for expressing their opinions on prostitution, but there remains, on top 
of that, the additional, affirmative requirement that the recipient entity pledge its opposition to 
prostitution.”). 
112
 USAID v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
113
 Id. at 2328. 
114
 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (“[W]hen the Government appropriates public funds to 
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 42–46. 
115
 See supra text accompanying notes 47–54. 
116
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328 (“‘Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its 
program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.’” (quoting 
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001))). 
117
 See infra text accompanying notes 119–136. 
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viewpoint-based discrimination, and its compulsory nature, in addition to its failure to act 
as a protection of government speech, revealed that the Requirement fell clearly outside 
of the permissible limitations of a government spending program.118 This section outlines 
the consolidation of the traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines into the new 
limits–leverage standard. 
A.  Alternative Channels Test 
¶32         To determine whether the Policy Requirement allowed Congress to leverage funds 
to regulate speech outside the scope of the Leadership Act, the Court looked to whether 
the Policy Requirement tolerated alternative channels for expression on prostitution.119 
Finding that a “recipient cannot avow the belief dictated by the Policy Requirement when 
spending Leadership Act funds, and . . . assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality, when 
participating in activities on its own time and dime,” the Court concluded that Leadership 
Act recipients did not have alternative channels to express their views on prostitution.120 
¶33         The Court analogized to League of Women Voters, in which the Court struck down a 
condition that prohibited broadcasting recipients from any editorializing.121 The AOSI 
Court emphasized that the condition went beyond the stated purpose of ensuring that 
federal funds were not used to editorialize public broadcasting and instead “leveraged the 
federal funding to regulate the stations’ speech outside the scope of the program.”122 
Applying the alternative channels test to the Policy Requirement, the Court found that 
because it prohibited recipients from acting contrary to the pledge against prostitution, 
even when using private funds, it regulated conduct outside of the program.123 
¶34         The Court rejected the agencies’ argument that the Guidelines served as an adequate 
channel, finding that the establishment of an affiliate cures the infringement of free 
speech only when the affiliate “allow[s] an organization bound by a funding condition to 
exercise its First Amendment rights outside the scope of the federal program.”124 Here, 
affiliates could not serve that purpose, since they had to be sufficiently separate from the 
recipient such that “the arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient to express 
its beliefs.”125 Because the Guidelines did not allow recipients to express their views on 
prostitution, the Policy Requirement left no room for alternative channels of 
expression.126 
                                                        
118




 Id. at 2330. 
121
 Id.; FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399 (1984). 
122
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2329. 
123
 See id. at 2330. While the agencies’ second appeal was pending, USAID and HHS promulgated 
regulations and guidance that prohibited non-exempted recipients from “engag[ing] in activities that are 
inconsistent with their opposition to prostitution and sex trafficking.” HHS Organization Integrity of 
Entities That Are Implementing Programs and Activities Under the Leadership Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,760, 
18,760 (Apr. 13, 2010) (codified in part at 45 C.F.R. § 89 (2014)); see USAID Acquisition & Assistance 
Policy Directive 05-04 amend. 3, Implementation of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, as amended – Eligibility Limitation on the Use of Funds and 
Opposition to Prostitution and Sex Trafficking (2010). 
124 
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B.  Viewpoint-Based Discrimination 
¶35         The Court continued by analyzing the Policy Requirement under the viewpoint-
based discrimination theory. The Court found that because the Act required that 
recipients espouse the government’s position on “an issue of public concern,
 
the 
condition by its very nature affects ‘protected conduct outside the scope of the federally 
funded program.’”127 Thus, the Court reasoned, the Requirement crossed the line from 
defining a federally-funded program to using funds to regulate beyond it by defining the 
recipient’s views on a controversial issue.128 
C.  Compelled Speech Versus Compelled Silence 
¶36         As further evidence that the Policy Requirement allowed Congress to regulate 
outside the Leadership Act program, the Court also highlighted its affirmative nature. The 
Requirement “compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by 
its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.”129 By forcing 
recipients to affirmatively declare opposition to prostitution, the condition regulated 
policy beyond the program to combat HIV/AIDS.130 
D.  Government Speech 
¶37         To further draw the distinction between proper limits and impermissible leveraging, 
the Court inquired whether the Leadership Act established government speech that 
Congress may properly protect.131 In Rust, Congress could prohibit funds from being used 
in programs where abortion was a method of family planning, as the restriction was 
meant to control the governmental message conveyed by the Title X programs.132 
According to the AOSI Court, Congress defined Title X to encourage only certain 
methods of family planning, such that the “regulations were simply designed to ensure 
that the limits of the federal program are observed, and that public funds [are] spent for 
the purposes for which they were authorized.”133 The Policy Requirement, on the other 
hand, fell beyond the confines of government speech because it acted on the recipient 
rather than on the government program.134 Because the Act already prohibited recipients 
from using the funds to “promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution 
or sex trafficking,”
135
 the Court found that the Policy Requirement must have been 
something more than a limit to protect the government’s views, thus reinforcing the line 
                                                        
127
 Id. at 2330 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991)).  
128
 Id.; see Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
129






 Id.; see Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
133
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2339–30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The AOSI Court 
also found that Rust involved a mere non-subsidy and that Congress could “selectively fund certain 
programs to address an issue of public concern, without funding alternative ways of addressing the same 
problem.” Id. at 2329. 
134
 Id. at 2330–31 (“By requiring recipients to profess a specific belief, the Policy Requirement goes 
beyond defining the limits of a federally funded program to defining the recipient.”). 
135
 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2008). 
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between the specifications of a federal program and the use of funds to control behavior 
outside of it.136 
E.  Understanding the Limits–Leverage Standard 
¶38         The limits–leverage standard distinguishes between restrictions intended to protect 
the purposes of a federal spending program and those designed to regulate speech beyond 
those purposes. In AOSI, the Court reframed the existing speech-conditioned doctrines, 
bundling them together to decipher when a condition that encroaches on free speech 
unlawfully restricts recipients’ First Amendment rights.  
¶39         Prior to AOSI, the Court often cited more than one doctrine in deciding speech-
conditioned funding cases,137 but never before articulated a broad standard incorporating 
them all. Instead, in preceding cases, the Court seemed to select one or more of the 
speech-conditioned funding doctrines based on the particular facts of the case. In this 
way, the Court can be said to have grabbed the nearest fire extinguisher to put out the 
precise issue at hand, without regard to other doctrines that did not immediately apply to 
the distinct set of facts. Unlike other areas of law that are defined, at least in form (if not 
in application), by clear rules, in speech-conditioned funding cases the Court has reached 
to the doctrine(s) that most easily applied to the specific facts. The result has been that 
each case internally coheres, but together the doctrines have not developed into a 
systematic test that allows parties to predict which speech-related conditions will be 
upheld and which will not. 
¶40         Although the limits–leverage standard is a far cry from a bright-line rule, it employs 
more than a fact-specific solution to funding restrictions that infringe upon free speech by 
consolidating the traditional speech-conditioned funding doctrines. It is unclear whether, 
under the AOSI standard, a court may still apply only one or some of the doctrines to a 
particular restriction while ignoring the others. Nevertheless, the standard draws a new 
line between the limits of federal spending and the exploitation of funds to regulate 
beyond the program. 
 
VII.  RATIONALES FOR FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR RECIPIENTS OF SPEECH-
CONDITIONED FUNDING 
¶41         The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”138 While many rationales for protecting free speech exist, three 
values are particularly important: (1) search for truth and advancement of knowledge;139 
                                                        
136
 AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2331. 
137
 See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
138
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
139
 The search for truth rationale is premised on the notion that the “ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 51–52 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991) (1859) (“[Free speech 
furthers the revelation of truth because it reveals] that the received opinion may be false, and some other 
opinion, consequently, true; or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is 
essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth . . . [or] when the conflicting doctrines, instead 
of being one true and the other false, share the truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is 
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(2) individual self-fulfillment;140 and (3) effective participation in democratic politics.141 
Each of these justifications for protecting free speech provides a persuasive account of 
First Amendment doctrine, and each maintains a significant position in popular discourse 
and scholarship.142 
¶42         Of these three rationales, however, the development of knowledge justification 
corresponds most exactly with conditional funding cases. This rationale is frequently 
explained by the “marketplace of ideas,” premised on the notion that truth and error will 
most easily be discovered if society may speak freely and the government does not 
intervene in speech and press freedom.143 Under this theory, any opinion, whether wrong, 
partially true, or wholly correct, has value in challenging prevailing opinions.144 To refuse 
a hearing to an opinion is to encumber both free speech and the development of truth and 
knowledge.145 
¶43         The self-fulfillment rationale fails to explain protection for recipients of speech-
conditioned funding because those recipients are almost always organizations, rather than 
individuals. The self-realization justification rests on human nature, asserting that free 
speech serves the “development of the individual’s powers and abilities” and “the 
individual’s control of his or her own destiny.”146 While self-expression by an 
organization may help the individuals within it to develop their abilities or to control their 
future, such expression is a step removed from the individualistic nature of the self-
fulfillment rationale.147 
¶44         The theory of free speech as necessary for democracy is similarly ineffective for 
rationalizing free speech protection for funding recipients. The argument for free speech 
from a democratic theory rests on the assumption that in order for government to be “by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.”); see 
also JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENCED 
PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 60 (Nov. 23, 1644) (“Let [Truth] and Fals[e]hood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the wors[e], in a free and open encounter[?]”). 
140
 Free expression sustains self-fulfillment by allowing the exercise of human capacity to create and 
express through speech. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of 
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
141
 The self-governance rationale asserts that, in a democratic system, citizens must be able to voice their 
views on general welfare issues so that representatives may understand the concerns and ideas of the 
constituency, and to ensure the public is well-informed before making decisions. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET 
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(1978); see also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982). 
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 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men have 
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”). 
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 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 54 (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991) 
(1859) (“[O]nly through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of 




 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 592 (1982). 
147
 See id.; see also David. A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the 
First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974). 
Vol. 13:1] Heather Blakeman 
   45 
the people, for the people,”148 citizens must be able to engage in meaningful debate149 and 
that citizens must be able to voice their views on public issues so that representatives may 
understand the concerns and ideas of the constituency.150 Although organizations also 
participate in civil society and politics, democracy places sovereignty in individuals, not 
entities. Thus, the democratic theory for free speech is an insufficient justification for 
speech protections with respect to funding conditions. 
¶45         The development of knowledge rationale justifies the protection of recipients of 
speech-conditioned funding. First, it applies equally well to individuals and entities, since 
opinions contributing to knowledge can be promulgated by either. Second, speech-related 
conditions on funding restrict opinions on issues of public importance from the public 
discourse. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that “the criterion of unconstitutionality 
is whether the denial of the subsidy threatens to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from 
the marketplace.”151 In League of Women Voters, the condition prevented broadcasters 
from expressing their opinions through editorializing.152 In Velazquez, the condition 
prevented legal aid recipients from expressing their opinions on welfare to the courts.153 
In AOSI, the Policy Requirement restricted recipients from expressing an opinion that 
combaters of HIV/AIDs should work with prostitutes rather than condemn them.154 These 
conditions removed important opinions from the public discourse and thus truncated the 
development of truth in those areas. Speech-conditioned funding implicates the 
development of knowledge theory of the First Amendment, and is scrutinized 
accordingly. 
¶46         The AOSI limits–leverage standard furthers the development of knowledge rationale 
for protecting free speech. By incorporating the alternative channels, viewpoint-based 
discrimination, compelled speech, and government speech doctrines, the limits–leverage 
standard preserves diversity in the “marketplace of ideas.” First, the alternative channels 
test directly advances a variety of ideas by inquiring whether recipients have another 
means of expressing themselves in the market. Second, the viewpoint-based 
discrimination doctrine, which raises scrutiny of conditions that limit discussion of 
controversial topics, furthers the development of knowledge by rendering suspect 
conditions that seek to restrict a particular viewpoint in the marketplace of ideas.155 Third, 
the standard’s heightened suspicion of conditions that compel certain speech recognizes 
that to force a recipient to profess a statement of belief directly constrains the variety of 
opinions in society.156 Finally, the government speech doctrine recognizes that the 
government may express its opinions as well, contributing to the development of 
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knowledge as any other actor.
157
 The limits–leverage standard, by incorporating a range 
of conditional funding doctrines, protects free speech and thus properly maintains the 
diversity of the marketplace of ideas. 
 
VIII.  THE LIMITS–LEVERAGE STANDARD: LITTLE IMPACT 
¶47         In theory, the limits–leverage standard is a victory for challengers to speech-related 
funding conditions. It not only applies the speech-conditioned funding cases more 
systematically than the Court’s prior tactic of applying whatever doctrine most closely fit 
the facts, but it supports free speech protection from speech-related funding conditions to 
advance the development of knowledge. Nonetheless, because AOSI did not extend the 
constitutional protection of the First Amendment to foreign recipients,158 the limits–
leverage standard will not be an effective means of protecting the free speech of many 
speech-conditioned funding recipients.  
A.  Congress Can Circumvent AOSI in Foreign Aid Cases 
¶48         Generally, foreign nationals do not receive the same constitutional benefits as U.S. 
citizens, particularly when those foreign nationals are outside of the United States.159 
Consequently, the AOSI decision does not protect foreign organizations.
160
 Thus, 
Congress may impose certain conditions on funding based on the identity of the 
recipient161 and can burden funds on restrictions that would be unconstitutional if applied 
to U.S. recipients.162 The practical implications of AOSI will be limited if Congress 
chooses to allocate funds to foreign recipients over domestic ones so that it may regulate 
recipients’ speech. The limits–leverage standard will neither protect free speech nor 
promote the development of knowledge with respect to conditions on foreign aid if its 
protections do not apply to recipients of speech-conditioned funds. 
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Vol. 13:1] Heather Blakeman 
   47 
¶49        Congress frequently prefers to allocate foreign aid funds to foreign, rather than 
domestic, organizations.
163
 Foreign organizations often have greater access to areas and 
people in need of foreign aid than their American counterparts.164 For programs that seek 
to affect international human rights, foreign governance, democracy, global health, and 
other issues, it is often just as effective for Congress to fund foreign organizations to 
implement the programs as domestic ones.165 Beginning in the 1980s, the U.S. 
government has relied increasingly on foreign NGOs to deliver developmental and 
humanitarian aid in aid-receiving countries, precisely because they generally have 
immense local and national expertise.166 As a result, the number of foreign NGOs has 
rapidly increased since the 1990s.167  
¶50         Furthermore, USAID habitually distributes federal funds conditioned on restrictions 
of speech to foreign NGOs. A well-known example is the Mexico City Policy, also 
known as the Global Gag Rule.168 Enforced sporadically from 1984 to 2009, the Mexico 
City Policy explicitly prohibited foreign recipients of U.S. family planning grants from 
engaging in abortion services.169 The policy precluded alternative channels for engaging 
in abortion-related activities because it proscribed recipients’ speech regardless of 
whether the recipients funded the activity using public or private funds.170 Although 
League of Women Voters struck down a condition on funds for U.S. recipients on the 
grounds that it created precisely this situation,
171
 legal challenges to the Mexico City 
Policy were unsuccessful.
172
 Consequently, some scholars argue the condition 
inappropriately held foreign organizations to a higher standard than their domestic 
counterparts, a discrepancy that both undermined fundamental constitutional values that 
the United States sought to promote internationally and presented the country as being 
hypocritical.173  
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¶51         More recently, Congress, through USAID, has continued to condition funds to 
foreign NGOs on restrictions of free speech through its funding application process. For 
example, pursuant to the Paraguay Democracy and Governance Program, USAID called 
for applications for funding solely from Paraguayan organizations.174 USAID required 
that the program “be implemented by a local organization”; as such, applicants must have 
been organized under the laws of Paraguay with their principal places of business in 
Paraguay.175 Similarly, as part of the Vietnamese branch of its Strategic Information 
Capacity for Sustainable HIV Response Program, USAID called only for applications 
from local Vietnamese organizations, requiring applicants to be similarly tied to Vietnam 
as the Paraguay program.176  
¶52         In USAID’s Afghanistan’s Counter Trafficking in Persons Program, the agency 
called for applicants with “local knowledge.”177 The application articulated the need for 
NGO partners with a “solid understanding” of local values and customs with respect to 
human trafficking.178 Although applications were not explicitly limited to foreign 
organizations, intimate knowledge of the country conditions was an explicit requirement 
of the program.179 If it finds that foreign organizations have a more intimate knowledge 
of local conditions, USAID can limit actual distribution of funds to foreign recipients.180  
¶53         Note that each of these programs specifically targets USAID goals in certain 
countries. USAID can funnel broader international goals into specific countries to target 
local applicants.181 By confining programs to certain countries, USAID can further target 
foreign recipients, which will in turn allow it to impose greater conditions on speech.  
 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
¶54         In AOSI, the Supreme Court articulated a new standard to determine whether 
speech-conditioned funding encroaches on recipients’ First Amendment rights. The line 
the Court drew, between conditions that “define the limits of the government spending 
program” and those that “seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours 
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of the program itself,”182 incorporated the alternative channels, viewpoint-based 
discrimination, compelled speech, and government speech doctrines. Applying this 
limits–leverage standard to the Leadership Act, the Court held that the Policy 
Requirement conditioning the receipt of funds on the adoption of a statement explicitly 
opposing the practice of prostitution unlawfully violated American recipients’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech.183 
¶55         The limits–leverage standard creates a more systematic analysis of funding 
conditions that implicate free speech than the Court’s prior approach of applying 
whatever doctrine most closely fit the facts. It also promulgates the primary justification 
for protecting federal funding recipients’ freedom of speech. However, the new standard 
is unlikely to significantly improve protections of free speech in foreign aid programs 
because the First Amendment does not protect foreign organizations as robustly as it does 
U.S. ones. Because Congress can allocate foreign aid funding to foreign recipients if it 
wishes to continue to impose speech-implicating conditions on foreign aid funds, in 
practice the AOSI standard is unlikely to advance the ideals that underlie First 
Amendment protections for speech-conditioned funding recipients. 
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